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and ISO:45001
Certified Company

HARYANA POWER GENERATION CORPORATION LTD

Regd. Office: C-7, Urja Bhawan, Sector-6, Panchkula
Corporate Identity Number : U45207HR1997SGC033517
Website: www.hpgcl.org.in
E-mail id: xen.rect@hpgcl.org.in

From

Chief Engineer/Admn.,
HPGCL, Panchkula.

To

1. All Chief Engineers in HPGCL.
2. All Financial Advisors & CAO in HPGCL.
3. SE/FTPS, HPGCL, Faridabad.

Memo No. 08 /Ch.142/HPGC/ENG/HPU/C-2025

Dated: 06 /01.2026.

Subject: - Important judgement passed by Hon'ble courts.

Kindly refer to the subject noted above.

In this context, enclosed please find herewith a copy of judgements (**list overleaf as Annexure-I**) passed by Hon'ble High Court, Chandigarh in the subject cited cases, received from the office of LR/HPU, Panchkula for praying dismissal of similar court cases by placing reliance on the ibid judgments.

This issues with the approval of Chief Engineer/Admn., HPGCL.

DA/As above

— sd —

XEN/ LNO,
For Chief Engineer/Admn.,
HPGCL, Panchkula

Endst. No. 08 /Ch-142/HPGC/ENG/HPU/C-2025

Dated: 06 /01/2026

A copy of the same is forwarded to XEN/IT, HPGCL, Panchkula with a request to upload the along-with office memos (**copies enclosed**) on the official website of HPGCL, please.

DA/As above.

(DA Mailed)

XEN/ LNO,

For Chief Engineer/Admn.,
HPGCL, Panchkula

CC:-

PS to Chief Engineer/Admn, HPGCL, Panchkula.

Annexure-I

Sr. No.	Subject	Judgements dated	Memo No.
1.	CWP No. 27775 of 2025 titled as Surender Vs DHBVN & Ors.	17.09.2025	No. 17/LB-2(138) dated 24.10.2025
2.	CWP No. 27779 of 2025 titled as Ramesh Vs DHBVN & Ors.		
3.	CWP No. 22525 of 2025 titled as Narayan Singh Vs DHBVN & Ors.	21.08.2025	No. 13-A/LB-2(129) dated 29.10.2025
4.	CWP No. 28194 of 2025 titled as Dinesh Singh Yagav Vs State of Haryana & Ors.	02.09.2025	No. 15/LB-2(141) dated 29.10.2025
5.	CWP No. 32142 of 2025 titled as Anil Kumar, CE Vs State of Haryana & Ors.	31.10.2025	No. 25/LB-2(158) dated 20.11.2025



HARYANA VIDYUT PRASARAN NIGAM LTD

Regd. Office : Shakti Bhawan, Plot No. C-4, Sector-6, Panchkula 134109
Corporate Identity Number : U40101HR1997SGC033683
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Telephone No. - 0172-2560769, 0172-2571841

To

Diary No. 1978 /dt. 03/11/25
AEE-G
AEE-R
AEE/AE-NG
Supdt. *[Signature]*
All Officers *[Signature]*

1. The CE/Admn. HVPNL, Panchkula.
2. The CE/Admn. UHBVN, Panchkula
3. The CE/Admn. DHBVN, Hisar.
4. The CE/Admn. HPGCL, Panchkula.

Memo No.: 17/LB-2(138)

Dated: 27.10.2025

[Signature]
XEN/Subject:

1. CWP No. 27775 of 2025 titled **Surender Vs. DHBVN & Ors.**
2. CWP No. 27779 of 2025 titled **Ramesh Vs. DHBVN & Ors.**

Attention is drawn to judgment dated 17.09.2025 passed in subject cited writ petition by the Hon'ble High Court whereby Hon'ble High Court dismissed the Writ petitions. The operative part order dated 17.09.2025 is reproduced here under:-


7. "Recently, a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puja Ferro Alloys (P) Ltd. v. State of Goa, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 326 speaking through Justice Dipankar Datta has reiterated the view that the principle of Res Judicata applies to petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Para 24 of the judgment is reproduced as under:

"24. It is now well settled that the principle of res judicata applies even to petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. If any authority is required one may profitably refer to the decision in T.P. Moideen Koya v. State of Kerala [(2004) 8 SCC 106].

The petitioners had earlier invoked the jurisdiction of this Court through CWP No. 20406 of 2024 and CWP No. 29480 of 2024, wherein they sought the very same relief of consequential benefits of regular pay, including annual increments and other admissible allowances, as is being prayed for in the present writ petition. This Court, vide order dated 14.02.2025 (Annexure P5), duly considered the

No. 6703 PS to CENM
Date 29/10/25
SE/Admn.
DS/Estt.
DS/Gcnl.
US/NGE
US/Rcctt.
DS/T&M
XEN/Hr. & Trg.
XEN/LNO
XEN/Civil

[Signature]
CENM



120+121

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

1)

CWP-27775-2025

Date of decision: 17.09.2025

Surender

....Petitioner

Versus

Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited and others

...Respondents

2)

CWP-27779-2025

Ramesh

....Petitioner

Versus

Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited and others

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present: Mr. Ravi Gakhar, Advocate for
Mr. Gurpreet Jayia, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).

Mr. S.S. Parmar, Advocate
for the respondents.


HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)

1. This common order shall dispose of the aforementioned civil writ petitions as they arise from a similar factual matrix. However, for the sake of brevity, the facts are taken from CWP-27775-2025.

2. The present petition(s) has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of *mandamus* to the effect that the petitioners be granted all consequential benefits of regular pay, including annual increments and other admissible allowances.


CONTENTIONS

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) submits that the petitioner(s) was appointed as a part time Mali on 23.03.1995 and the duties assigned to him



have been identical in nature to those discharged by other employees holding different posts and has rendered more than 20 years of unbroken service. He further relies upon the judgment of this Court passed in CWP No.2326 of 2011 titled as *Chhabi Lal and others Vs. State of Haryana* decided on 20.05.2015 which directed the regularization of similarly situated employees. The petitioner then filed CWP No.13700 of 2015 which was allowed on 24.04.2018 directing the regularization of the petitioners' services. Thereafter, the respondents' filed an appeal bearing LPA No.343 of 2019 which was dismissed on 21.07.2022. Due to non-compliance, the petitioner filed COCP No.3415 of 2018 and during its pendency, the respondents issued a regularization offer dated 14.07.2022 with effect from 03.11.2017. The petitioner then moved this Court vide CWP 20406-2024 claiming regularisation with effect from 29.07.2011 at par with his juniors instead of 03.11.2017. The said petition was disposed of vide order dated 14.02.2025 (Annexure P-5) and the petitioner was correctly regularised with effect from 29.07.2011. It is argued that despite this correction, the Respondents have failed to release the consequential benefits of regular pay, including annual increments and other admissible allowances from 29.07.2011.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents at the very outset submits that the present petition filed by the petitioner would be hit by the principle of *Res Judicata* as earlier, the petitioner(s) in both the writ petitions have approached this Court by filing CWP No.20406 of 2024 and CWP No.29480 of 2024 in which reliance has been placed upon CWP No.2326 of 2011 titled as *Chhabi Lal and others Vs. State of Haryana and others* and judgment dated 10.10.2017 passed in LPA No.1700 of 2015 titled as *HVPNL and others Vs. Chhabi Lal and others*. The Coordinate Bench of this Court has considered



the controversy involved in the present case and has only allowed notional regularization of the petitioner(s) with effect from 29.07.2011 on the ground of parity as discernible from Annexure P-5. The prayer in CWP No.20406-2024 is reproduced as under:-

“Civil Writ Petition under Article 226/227 constitution of India with the prayer for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the inaction of the respondents for regularizing the services of the petitioner from 03.11.2017 erroneously whereby the petitioner is entitled to get his services regularized with effect from 29.07.2011 at par with his juniors in view of well settled laws as referred in the present petition hence the same is illegal, arbitrary against the principles of natural justice hence warranted kind indulgence of this Hon'ble court in view of facts and circumstances enumerated in the present petition.

AND

Further prayer for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents for regularizing the services of the petitioner with effect from 29.07.2011 granting fixation of pay in regular scale, arrears, seniority on the basis of the revised pay scale including all the consequential benefits associated with regularization in view of facts and circumstances enumerated in the present petition.” (Emphasis supplied)

Further, the relevant portion of the order dated 14.02.2025 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner(s) is reproduced as under:-

*“3. The petitioner claims that he was regularized in terms of judgment dated 20.05.2015 passed in CWP-2326 of 2011 titled as ‘Chhabi Lal and others Vs. State of Haryana and others’ and judgment dated 10.10.2017 passed in LPA No. 1700 of 2015 titled as ‘HVPNL and others Vs. Chhabi Lal and others’. He was regularized along with other similarly situated employees. The other employees have been regularized notionally w.e.f. 29.07.2011 though cash benefits are extended from the date of joining as regular Peon/Sweeper. **The petitioner on the ground of parity deserves notional regularization w.e.f. 29.07.2011.***

4. Faced with order dated 16.12.2020 (Annexure P-8) passed in the case of similarly situated employees and order dated 14.07.2022 (Annexure P-3) passed in the case of petitioner, Ms. Rajni Gupta, Addl. A.G., Haryana submits that Competent Authority would reconsider claim of



the petitioner in terms of order dated 16.12.2020 passed in the case of other employees.” (Emphasis supplied)

5. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that in the earlier writ petition along with the prayer of regularization, second prayer was made with regard to fixation of pay, arrears, seniority on the basis of revised pay scale including all consequential benefits with regularization. As such, the second petition on the same cause of action seeking the same relief would further be struck by the principle of *Res Judicata*. If the petitioner is having any surviving grievance against the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench on 14.02.2025, he has the right to file an Intra Court Appeal.

OBSERVATION & ANALYSIS

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and after careful perusal of record of the case with his able assistance, this Court is of the opinion that the present petition is in teeth of the principle of *Res Judicata*. A Two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *P. Bandopadhyaya v. Union of India, (2019) 13 SCC 42* speaking through Justice Indu Malhotra has held as follows:

“8.11. The decision in S.V. Vasaikar v. Union of India [S.V. Vasaikar v. Union of India, 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 171 : (2003) 2 Mah LJ 691 : (2003) 4 Bom CR 79] was not challenged before the Supreme Court, and has since attained finality. Therefore, the relief sought by the appellants before the High Court was barred by the principle of res judicata. Reference can be made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra [Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 339 : AIR 1990 SC 1607] wherein Sharma, J., on behalf of the five-Judge Bench, held: (SCC pp. 740-41, para 35)

“35. ... It is well established that the principles of res judicata are applicable to writ petitions. The relief prayed for on behalf of the petitioner in the present case is the same as he would have, in the event of his success, obtained in the earlier writ petition before



the High Court. The petitioner in reply contended that since the special leave petition before this Court was dismissed in limine without giving any reason, the order cannot be relied upon for a plea of res judicata. The answer is that it is not the order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition which is being relied upon; the plea of res judicata has been pressed on the basis of the High Court's judgment which became final after the dismissal of the special leave petition. In similar situation a Constitution Bench of this Court in Daryao v. State of U.P. [Daryao v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457] held that where the High Court dismisses a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution after hearing the matter on the merits, a subsequent petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same reliefs filed by the same parties will be barred by the general principle of res judicata. The binding character of judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in essence a part of the rule of law on which the administration of justice, so much emphasised by the Constitution, is founded and a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits must bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided by the Constitution and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by a petition under Article 32.


(emphasis supplied)

Albeit the decision of the Constitution Bench was in the context of a writ petition filed under Article 32, it would apply with greater force to bar a writ petition filed under Article 226, like the one filed by the present appellants, by the operation of the principle of res judicata.

(Emphasis supplied)

7. Recently, a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Puja Ferro Alloys (P) Ltd. v. State of Goa, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 326* speaking through Justice Dipankar Datta has reiterated the view that the principle of *Res Judicata* applies to petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Para 24 of the judgement is reproduced as under:

"24. It is now well settled that the principle of res judicata applies even to petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. If any authority is required one may profitably refer to the decision in T.P. Moideen Koya v. State of Kerala [(2004) 8 SCC 106]."



8. The petitioners had earlier invoked the jurisdiction of this Court through CWP No. 20406 of 2024 and CWP No. 29480 of 2024, wherein they sought the very same relief of consequential benefits of regular pay, including annual increments and other admissible allowances, as is being prayed for in the present writ petition. This Court, vide order dated 14.02.2025 (Annexure P-5), duly considered the controversy in issue and granted only the relief of notional regularization of the petitioners w.e.f. 29.07.2011, on the ground of parity. Accordingly, the present writ petition, which seeks the same relief, is barred by the principle of *Res judicata* and is thus not maintainable.

9. In view of the discussion above, this Court does not find it appropriate to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present petitions stand dismissed.

10. A photo copy of this order be placed on the file of connected case.

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE

17.09.2025
Neha

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No



HARYANA VIDYUT PRASARAN NIGAM LTD

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Correspondence E-mail - lr@hvpn.org.in, anusinglaalo@edhbvn.org.in
Telephone No. - 0172-2560769, 0172-2571841

To

1. The CE/Admn. HVPNL, Panchkula.
2. The CE/Admn. UHBVN, Panchkula
3. The CE/Admn. DHBVN, Hisar.
4. The CE/Admn. HPGCL, Panchkula.

Memo No.:13-A/LB-2(129)

Dated: 29.10.2025

Subject: CWP No. 22525 of 2025 titled Narayan Singh Vs. DHBVN & Ors.

Attention is drawn to judgment dated 21.08.2025 passed in subject cited writ petition by the Hon'ble High Court whereby Hon'ble High Court dismissed the Writ petition. The operative part order dated 21.08.2025 is reproduced here under:-

No. 1925
 12/11/25
 AEE-G
 AEE-R
 AEE/AE-NG
 Supdt.
 All Officers
 WPC
 W
 AD
 XEN/LNO

“6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and after a careful perusal of record of the case with their able assistance, it transpires that the petitioner ought to have the requisite technical qualification to be recruited by the respondent-Department. The matter pertaining to the fabricated nature of his mark sheet did not come to light till after 12 years of his service. However, the delay cannot be used by the petitioner to claim condonation of the fraud committed by him.

9. Further, a three-Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Jainendra Singh vs. State of U.P. Tr. Prinl. Sec. Home (2012) 8 SCC 748*, has categorically held that no estoppels would operate in favour of those who acquired employment by defrauding the employer. Speaking through Justice Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, the following was held:

“31. As noted by us, all the above decisions were rendered by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of two-Judges and having bestowed our serious consideration to the issue, we consider that while dealing with such an issue, the Court will have to bear in mind the various cardinal principles before granting any relief to the aggrieved party, namely:

DS/Estt.
 DS/Genl.
 US/NGE
 US/Rectt.
 DS/T&M
 XEN/Hr.& Trg.
 XEN/LNO
 XEN/Civil

No. 6987 PS to CE/Admn.
 Date 11/11/25
 SE/Admn.

11/11/25
 CF/Admn

(i) **Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment could be legitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employer or could be recalled by the employer and in such cases merely because the respondent employee has continued in service for a number of years, on the basis of such fraudulently obtained employment, cannot get any equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer.**

(ii) **Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to the post under the State and on account of his antecedents the appointing**

authority if find not desirable to appoint a person to a disciplined force can it be said to be unwarranted.

(iii) When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry.

(iv) A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service and the employer, having regard to the nature of employment as well as other aspects, has the discretion to terminate his services. Purpose of calling for information regarding involvement in any criminal case or detention or conviction is for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedents at the time of recruitment and suppression of such material information will have clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the candidate in relation to his continuity in service.

(v) The person who suppressed the material information and/or gives false information cannot claim any right for appointment or continuity in service."

It is an important judgment on the issue that the claim of the petitioner to the post was rejected on the basis of submission of false education certificates with respect to the essential qualification required by Nigam.

It is therefore requested to circulate the judgment amongst the subordinate under your control to dismiss the similar cases by placing reliance on the judgment dated 21.08.2025 passed by Hon'ble High Court. It is also requested to direct the concerned CE/IT and SE/IT DHBVN to host the judgment dated 21.08.2025 on the website of concerned Power Utility. A complete copy of judgment dated 21.08.2025 is enclosed herewith for ready reference.

DA/As above



Legal Officer,
For LR, HPU, Panchkula.

CC:

The S.E./XEN/IT, UHBVN, HVPNL, HPGCL, DHBVN, Panchkula/Hisar are requested to upload the judgment dated 21.08.2025 on the website of their utility.

116 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

CWP-22525-2025

Date of decision: 21.08.2025

Narayan Singh

....Petitioner

Versus

Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd and others

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present: Mr. Abhinav Sood, Advocate,
Mr. Achintya Soni, Advocate and
Mr. Sayyam Garg, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Sandeep Kashyap, Advocate for
Mr. Vikrant Pamboo, Additional A.G., Haryana
for the respondents.

HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)

1. The present civil writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of *certiorari* for quashing of the impugned order dated 19.06.2024 (Annexure P-13) passed by respondent No.3-the Superintending Engineer vide which the petitioner has been dismissed from service as a Lineman with respondent-DHVNVL at Hassanpur and the order dated 01.10.2024 (Annexure P-16) whereby the appeal of the petitioner against the same was dismissed by respondent No.2-the Chief Engineer.

2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the petitioner was admitted to the State Industrial Training Institute, Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter 'ITI') on 20.08.2008, as reflected by the admission register (Annexure P-1). In the month of July, 2010, he cleared final exams and was issued certificate

(Annexure P-2). In the year 2011, the petitioner applied to the post of Assistant Line Man floated by Haryana Staff Selection Commission through advertisement No.1/2011. He was duly selected and a letter of appointment dated 26.10.2012 (Annexure P-3) was issued to him. Subsequently, on 07.10.2020, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Line Man.

3. However, in the year 2023, the marksheet of the petitioner were sent for verification to the ITI by respondent No.4-XEN(OP) Division. The Principal, ITI, vide letter dated 27.06.2023 (Annexure P-5) confirmed the veracity of the marksheet. The respondent-Department was not satisfied with the same and the Secretary, State Council for Vocational Training was requested to verify it again. A report dated 31.07.2023 (Annexure P-6) was submitted wherein it was stated that verification was not possible, however, later, vide letter dated 02.02.2024 (Annexure P-7) it was stated that the verification stands completed by the Assistant Director, State Industrial Training Council. Ultimately, a two-member committee was formed vide order No.26 dated 12.03.2024 and the petitioner's certificate was found to be "not entered in the records." A show cause notice dated 10.04.2024 was issued to the petitioner and consequently, the vide impugned order dated 19.06.2024 (Annexure P-13), his services were dispensed with.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner *inter alia* contends that the petitioner has been erroneously dismissed from service for submitting a fake technical education certificate. The marksheet of the petitioner was duly verified vide report dated 27.06.2023 (Annexure P-5) and 02.02.2024 (Annexure P-7) and yet the respondents arbitrarily inquired into the matter again, tainting it with *mala fide*. He further submits that the petitioner was dismissed from service in without joining him in the verification process, which

is contravention of Rule 7 of the Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Employees (Punishment and Appeal Regulations, 2019 (hereinafter 'the Regulations'). Since a prescribed procedure exists in this regard, the veracity of the education qualifications of the petitioner should have been examined by the disciplinary authorities in strict compliance thereof. Reliance in this regard is placed on *Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. vs. Union of India and others (2019) 5 SCC 480*. Learned counsel further submits that the procedural safeguards in the Regulations are in consonance with the Article 21 of the Constitution of India and exist to ensure fairness in the disciplinary proceedings. Relying upon *Mrs. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Another (1978) 1 SCC 248*, he submits that the procedure adopted by the respondents is not fair, just or reasonable, and therefore, is in direct violation Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgments rendered by Coordinate benches of this Court in *Kulbir Singh vs. The Punjab State Power Corporation Limited, Patiala and others CWP No.15976 of 2013 decided on 25.10.2016*, *Sukhdev Singh vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee CWP No.17784 of 2015 decided on 18.10.2016* and *Rajwant Kaur vs. State of Punjab and others CWP No.3728 of 2012 decided on 22.07.2013*. Learned counsel also apprises this Court that two similarly situated employees have also approached this Court for a similar relief vide writ petitions bearing nos. CWP No.15468 of 2024, CWP No.32140 of 2024 and CWP No.11227 of 2025, which are currently pending consideration.

5. *Per contra*, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner had approached this Court earlier by filing CWP No.17574 of 2024 wherein identical arguments were raised. However, the said writ petition was withdrawn with the liberty to file statutory appeal, as such, the present petition

is not maintainable in view of the principle of *res judicata*. Further, the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands as one FIR No.0225 dated 27.07.2025 has been registered against the petitioner under Sections 420/467/468/471 at Police Station Hodal for submitting fake and fabricated certificates.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and after a careful perusal of record of the case with their able assistance, it transpires that the petitioner ought to have the requisite technical qualification to be recruited by the respondent-Department. The matter pertaining to the fabricated nature of his marksheet did not come to light till after 12 years of his service. However, the delay cannot be used by the petitioner to claim condonation of the fraud committed by him.

7. It is pertinent to note that the initial inquiry with respect to the veracity of the educational qualifications of the petitioner was made through post. However, subsequently, a committee was formed which discovered that the ITI certificate issued against Roll No.01811032 (Trade Engineer) did not find any mention in the records. Moreover, a show cause notice dated 10.04.2024 (Annexure P-8) was issued to the petitioner to explain the discrepancy. The explanation put forth by the petitioner was found to be unconvincing and therefore, his services were eventually terminated. A two-Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Ram Chandra Singh vs. Savitri Devi and others (2003) 8 SCC 319*, speaking through Justice S.B.Sinha, the following was opined:

15. Commission of fraud on court and suppression of material facts are the core issues involved in these matters. Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together.

16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response

to the conduct of the former either by word or letter.

17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud.

18. **A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad.**

19. In *Derry v. Peek*, (1889)14 AC 337 : (1886-90) All ER Rep 1 : 58 LJ Ch 864 : 61 LT 265 (HL). it was held:

"In an action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it be true or false.

A false statement, made through carelessness and without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, may be evidence of fraud but does not necessarily amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made in the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and does not render the person making it liable to an action of deceit.

20. In *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, at p. 23, it is stated:

"The true and only sound principle to be derived from the cases represented by *Slim v. Croucher*, (1860)1 De GF & J 518 : 29 LJ Ch 273 : 2 LT 103 : 45 ER 462. is this: that a representation is fraudulent not only when the person making it knows it to be false, but also when, as *Jessel, M.R.*, pointed out, he ought to have known, or must be taken to have known, that it was false. This is a sound and intelligible principle, and is, moreover, not inconsistent with *Derry v. Peek*, (1889)14 AC 337 : (1886-90) All ER Rep 1 : 58 LJ Ch 864 : 61 LT 265 (HL).. A false statement which a person ought to have known was false, and which he must therefore be taken to have known was false, cannot be said to be honestly believed in. 'A consideration of the grounds of belief', said Lord *Herschell*, 'is no doubt an important aid in ascertaining whether the belief was really entertained. A man's mere assertion that he believed the statement he made to be true is not accepted as conclusive proof that he did so.'"

21. In *Bigelow on Fraudulent Conveyances*, at p. 1, it is stated:

"If on the facts the average man would have intended wrong, that is enough."

22. It was further opined:

"This conception of fraud (and since it is not the writer's, he may speak of it without diffidence), steadily kept in view, will render the administration of the law less difficult, or rather will make its administration more effective. Further, not to enlarge upon the last matter, it will do away with much of the prevalent confusion in regard to 'moral' fraud, a confusion which, in addition to other things, often causes lawyers to take refuge behind such convenient and indeed useful but often obscure language as 'fraud upon the law'. What is fraud upon the law? Fraud can be committed only

against a being capable of rights, and 'fraud upon the law' darkens counsel. What is really aimed at in most cases by this obscure contrast between moral fraud and fraud upon the law, is a contrast between fraud in the individual's intention to commit the wrong and fraud as seen in the obvious tendency of the act in question."

23. Recently this Court by an order dated 3-9-2003 in **Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education, (2003)8 SCC 311 : JT 2003 Supp (1) SC 25**. held:

"Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. (See *Derry v. Peek, (1889)14 AC 337*.)

In **Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956)1 All ER 341**: the Court of Appeal stated the law thus:

"I cannot accede to this argument for a moment. No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever;"

In **S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994)1 SCC 1** this Court stated that fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal."

24. **An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.** (emphasis added)

8. At this juncture, it would be profitable to refer to the legal maxims- *nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria* which can be translated to- no man can take advantage of his own wrong, and *sublato fundamento cadit opus* which translates to- when the foundation is removed, the structure falls. The very recruitment of the petitioner is based on fraud and as such, he cannot claim any subsequent benefits that arise by virtue of employment. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the drill of Clause 7 of the Regulations was not followed, however, these Regulations refer to the procedure that ought to be adopted in the event of any misconduct during service. Since the petitioner obtained employment on the basis of a forged and fabricated

certificate/marksheet, he cannot take shelter of the prescribed procedure to escape accountability as fraud vitiates all. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Union of India vs. Prohlad Guha 2024 AIR SC 3588*.

9. Further, a three-Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Jainendra Singh vs. State of U.P. Tr. Prinl. Sec. Home (2012) 8 SCC 748*, has categorically held that no estoppels would operate in favour of those who acquired employment by defrauding the employer. Speaking through Justice Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, the following was held:

"31. As noted by us, all the above decisions were rendered by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of two-Judges and having bestowed our serious consideration to the issue, we consider that while dealing with such an issue, the Court will have to bear in mind the various cardinal principles before granting any relief to the aggrieved party, namely:

(i) Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment could be legitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employer or could be recalled by the employer and in such cases merely because the respondent employee has continued in service for a number of years, on the basis of such fraudulently obtained employment, cannot get any equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer.

(ii) Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to the post under the State and on account of his antecedents the appointing authority if find not desirable to appoint a person to a disciplined force can it be said to be unwarranted.

(iii) When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry.

(iv) A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service and the employer, having regard to the nature of employment as well as other aspects, has the discretion to terminate his services. Purpose of calling for information regarding involvement in any criminal case or detention or conviction is for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedents at the time of recruitment and suppression of such material information will have clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the candidate in relation to his continuity in service.

(vi) The person who suppressed the material information and/or

gives false information cannot claim any right for appointment or continuity in service.

xxx

xxx

xxx”


10. In view of the discussion above, this Court does not find any merit in the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner as the petitioner obtained employment with the respondent-Department by indulging in fraud and deceit. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed.

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE

21.08.2025

Neha

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No



HARYANA VIDYUT PRASARAN NIGAM LTD

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Telephone No. - 0172-2560769, 0172-2571841

To

1. The CE/Admn. HVPNL, Panchkula.
2. The CE/Admn. UHBVN, Panchkula
3. The CE/Admn. DHBVN, Hisar.
4. The CE/Admn. HPGCL, Panchkula.

Memo No.: 15/LB-2(141)

Dated: 29.10.2025

Subject: CWP No. 28194 of 2025 titled Dinesh Singh Yadav Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.

Attention is drawn to judgment dated 22.09.2025 passed in subject cited writ petition by the Hon'ble High Court whereby Hon'ble High Court dismissed the Writ petition. The operative part order dated 22.09.2025 is reproduced here under:-

"We find substance in the objection raised by the respondents, inasmuch as there is no justification furnished in the writ petition for challenging the advertisement issued in the year 2019 by filing a writ in the year 2025. It is undisputed that the recruitment, has already concluded, and persons have been appointed way back in the year 2021. Those selected persons have not been impleaded in the petition. In such circumstances, and after such long lapse of time, we are not persuaded to entertain the present petition merely on the ground that a Coordinate Bench has held the award of marks under the socio-economic criteria to be invalid.

The writ petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of."

It is an important judgment on inordinate delay and laches wherein Hon'ble Court has categorically held that where any recruitment exercise is challenged after its conclusion and beyond limitation such challenge is to be treated as void being grossly barred by laches and delay.

It is therefore requested to circulate the judgment amongst the subordinate under your control for dismissal of ongoing similar cases by placing reliance on the judgment dated 22.09.2025 passed by Hon'ble High Court. It is also requested to direct the concerned SE/IT to host the judgment dated 22.09.2025 on the website of concerned Power Utility. A complete copy of judgment dated 22.09.2025 is enclosed herewith for ready reference.

DA/As above

No. 6984 PS to CE/Admn.
Date 11/11/25
SE/Admn.

CE/Admn

Legal Officer,
For LR, HPU, Panchkula.

CC:

The S.E./XEN/IT, UHBVN, HVPNL, HPGCL, DHBVN, Panchkula/Hisar are requested to upload the judgment dated 22.09.2025 on the website of their utility.

Diary No. 1927 /dt. 12/11/25

AEE-G

AEE-R

AEE/AE-NG

Supdt.

All Officers

XEN/LNO

DS/Estt.

DS/Genl.

US/NGE


US/Rcctt.

DS/T&M

XEN/Hr. & Trg.

XEN/L

XEN/Civil



2025:PHHC:131138-DB

**132 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

CWP-28194-2025

Date of Decision: 22.09.2025

DINESH SINGH YADAV

... PETITIONER

VS.

STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS

.. RESPONDENTS

**CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHIT KAPOOR**

Present: Mr. Mayank Yadav, Advocate,
for the petitioner.

Mr. Sourabh Mohunta, DAG, Haryana
for respondents No. 1 and 3.

Mr. Pankaj Middha, Addl. A.G.Haryana.
For respondent No.2.

ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J. (ORAL)

The short question that arises for our consideration in the facts of the case is as to whether the notification dated 11.06.2019, whereby recruitment was initiated against the posts in question by making provisions for the award of marks under the socio-economic criteria, is required to be interfered with in a petition filed in the year 2025, only because this Court has disapproved the award of marks under the socio-economic criteria.

2. It is not in dispute that the recruitment in question was initiated pursuant to an advertisement issued on 05.07.2019. The recruitment process concluded in the year 2021. No challenge was made by the petitioner at any stage, either to the advertisement or to the selection of the persons who had secured appointment pursuant thereto. It is only after the expiry of sufficient period that the writ petition has been filed, without impleading any of the selected candidates, seeking quashing of the advertisement as well as

consequential action on the ground that the socio-economic criteria was not a valid criteria for the award of any marks.

3. Learned State counsel opposes the petition on the ground that the same is grossly barred by laches.

4. We find substance in the objection raised by the respondents, inasmuch as there is no justification furnished in the writ petition for challenging the advertisement issued in the year 2019 by filing a writ in the year 2025. It is undisputed that the recruitment has already concluded, and persons have been appointed way back in the year 2021. Those selected persons have not been impleaded in the petition. In such circumstances, and after such long lapse of time, we are not persuaded to entertain the present petition merely on the ground that a Coordinate Bench has held the award of marks under the socio-economic criteria to be invalid.

5. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

6. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.


(ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA)
JUDGE

(ROHIT KAPOOR)
JUDGE

22.09.2025

smriti

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No



HARYANA VIDYUT PRASARAN NIGAM LTD

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Correspondence E-mail - lr@hvpn.org.in, anusinglaalo@edhbvn.org.in
Telephone No. - 0172-2560769, 0172-2571841

To

1. The CE/Admn. HVPNL, Panchkula.
2. The CE/Admn. UHBVN, Panchkula
3. The CE/HR & Admn. DHBVN, Hisar.
4. The CE/Admn. HPGCL, Panchkula.

Memo No.: 25/LB-2(158)

Dated: 10.11.2025

Subject: CWP No. 32142 of 2025 titled Anil Kumar, CE Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.

Attention is drawn to judgment dated 31.10.2025 passed in subject cited writ petition by the Hon'ble High Court whereby the Hon'ble High Court dismissed the Writ petition. The operative part order dated 31.10.2025 is reproduced here under:-

"3.Learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 4 has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in LPA No.987 of 1992, titled as Ved Pal Mor vs State of Haryana, decided on 07.10.1998, wherein it has been held as follows:- 14. It is undoubtedly correct that whenever a matter is brought to the Court, delay is one of the factors which is taken into consideration. Even though no limitation has been specifically provided for approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, yet the rule of refusal to interfere on the ground of delay is invariably followed by the Court. Despite the fact that no period of limitation has been specifically laid down, the Court rejects a complaint whenever there is unexplained delay or even when a triable issue of limitation arises. However, this rule of delay does not govern administrative action. Whenever an authority finds that an error has been committed, it has the undoubted jurisdiction and discretion to rectify the mistake.

7. In view of the foregoing discussions, it is evident that the benefit of counting the period of Extra-Ordinary Leave taken by the petitioner towards service continuity and increments was contrary to the governing statutory provisions. The respondents are justified in rectifying the mistake and ordering recovery of the excess amount paid to the petitioner. The impugned order dated 24.10.2025

- DS/Estt.
- DS/Genl.
- US/NGE
- US/Rcctt.
- DS/T&M
- XEN/Hr.& Trg.
- XEN/LNO
- XEN/Civil

No. 7476 PS to CE/Admn.
Date: 27/11/25
SE/Admn.

CE/Admn

28/11

Diary No. 2017/dt. 03/12/25
AEE-G
AEE-R
AEE/AE-NG
Supdt.

All Officers

XEN/LNO

W/C
R/C

(Annexure P-1) thus calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed."

It is an important judgment on ratification of mistake with respect to grant of benefits contrary to the governing statutory provision and ordering recovering of excess amount paid to the petitioner.

It is therefore requested to circulate the judgment amongst the subordinate under your control for dismissal of ongoing similar cases by placing reliance on the judgment dated 31.10.2025 passed by Hon'ble High Court. It is also requested to direct the concerned SE/IT to host the judgment dated 31.10.2025 on the website of concerned Power Utility. A complete copy of judgment dated 31.10.2025 is enclosed herewith for ready reference.

DA/As above



Law Researcher.
For L.R. HPU, Panchkula.

CC:

1. The S.E./XEN/IT, UHBVN, HVPNL, HPGCL, DHBVN, Panchkula/Hisar are requested to upload the judgment dated 31.10.2025 on the website of their utility.
2. The Joint Secy./Legal, HVPNL, Panchkula.
3. The Under Secy./Legal, HVPNL, Panchkula.
4. Dy. District Attorney-I, HVPNL, Panchkula.
5. Dy. District Attorney-II, HVPNL, Panchkula.
6. Sh. Aman Dhiman, Legal Consultant, UHBVN, Panchkula.
7. Legal Consultant, HVPNL, Panchkula.
8. Legal Consultant, HPGCL, Panchkula.
9. Law Officer, HVPNL, Panchkula.
10. Law Officer, DHBVNL, Panchkula.
11. Law Officer, UHBVNL, Panchkula.
12. Legal Officer, UHBVN, Panchkula.
13. ALO-1 UHBVN, Panchkula.
14. ALO-2, UHBVN, Panchkula.
15. ALO-3, UHBVN, Panchkula.
16. ALO, DHBVN, Panchkula.
17. ALO, HVPNL, Panchkula.

CWP-32142-2025

1

2025:PHHC:149767

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

113

CWP-32142-2025 (O&M)
Date of decision: 31.10.2025

Anil Kumar

....Petitioner

Versus

State of Haryana and others

....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present: Mr. Ashwani Bhardwaj, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Vikrant Pamboo, Addl. A.G., Haryana
for respondent No.1.

Mr. Prince Singh, Advocate
for respondents No.2 to 4.

HARPREET SINGH BRAR J. (Oral)


1. Prayer in this writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is for issuance of a writ in the nature of *certiorari*, for quashing the impugned order dated 24.10.2025 (Annexure P-1) vide which the respondents have ordered recovery of alleged excess payment on account of increments granted to the petitioner for the period of Extra-Ordinary leave (EOL) from 08.11.2007 to 20.12.2012 (on the basis of agenda item No.367.38 dated 27.08.2025(Annexure P-2). Further a writ of *mandamus* has been sought, directing the respondents not to effect any recovery or interfere with the petitioner's settled pay fixation along with all consequential benefits.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, *inter alia*, contends that the impugned order of recovery was passed on 24.10.2025 (Annexure P-) after a gap of 11 years. The petitioner was granted Extra-Ordinary Leave from 08.11.2007 to 20.12.2012 under the applicable policy of 2007. In terms of the policy, the petitioner has deposited 10% of his salary during the leave period. In the year 2014, based upon the legal opinion and relying upon the judgment rendered by this Court in CWP-6852-2021, titled as *Suresh Kumar Chillar vs Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited and another*, decided on 19.01.2024, the respondent/Nigam counted the leave period of the petitioner towards service continuity and granted notional increments. The benefit, which was granted in the year 2014, was disturbed after a period of 11 years solely on the basis of an opinion rendered by the Finance Department. The respondent/Nigam issued a show cause notice to the petitioner and subsequently passed the impugned recovery order. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in *State of Punjab and others vs Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (2015) 4 SCC 334* and submits that any recovery of the excess payment after a period of 05 years is not permissible and the impugned action of the respondent/Nigam is also contrary to the judgment rendered by this Court in *Suresh Kumar Chillar's case (supra)*, in which this Court has set-aside the impugned order of recovery passed in similar fashion and the case of the petitioner is identical to the aforementioned *Suresh Kumar Chillar's case (supra)*.

CWP-32142-2025

3

2025:PHHC:149767



3. *Per contra*, learned State counsel as well as learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 4 submits that Extra-Ordinary Leave was granted on the request of the petitioner and for counting the leave period as service continuity is neither contemplated under the Policy of 2007 nor permissible under the Punjab Civil Services Rules Volume I Part I. Learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 4 further submits that the increments and consequential benefits were erroneously granted to the petitioner, and upon detection of the error, the respondent/Nigam was well within its right to rectify the mistake, ordered recovery of the excess amount paid. He further contends that Rules are very explicit that such benefit can only be granted to the employees who have been given Extra-Ordinary Leave on medical grounds. Further the increment, in question, was not granted by the department rather the entire exercise was done on the request made by the petitioner and only, thereafter, his request was processed, which was wrongly granted de hors the mandate of the applicable service rules. Further reliance of the petitioner on *Rafiq Masih's case (supra)* is totally misplaced and the case of the petitioner is distinguished even from *Suresh Kumar Chillar's case (supra)* as this Court in Para 12 of the said judgment has declared the recovery of the excess payment unsustainable primarily on the ground that the employee had retired and no show cause notice was served upon him whereas the facts of the present petition are clearly distinguishable as the petitioner is not only in service rather there is no violation of rule of *audi alteram partem*. Learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 4 has

relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in LPA No.987 of 1992, titled as *Ved Pal Mor vs State of Haryana*, decided on 07.10.1998, wherein it has been held as follows:-

14. It is undoubtedly correct that whenever a matter is brought to the Court, delay is one of the factors which is taken into consideration. Even though no limitation has been specifically provided for approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, yet the rule of refusal to interfere on the ground of delay is invariably followed by the Court. Despite the fact that no period of limitation has been specifically laid down, the Court rejects a complaint whenever there is unexplained delay or even when a triable issue of limitation arises. However, this rule of delay does not govern administrative action. Whenever an authority finds that an error has been committed, it has the undoubted jurisdiction and discretion to rectify the mistake.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

5. From the perusal of the record, it transpires that the petitioner applied for Extra-Ordinary Leave, which was granted to him w.e.f. 08.11.2007 to 20.12.2012. Further, a perusal of Extra-Ordinary Leave Policy, 2007 (Annexure P-3) reveals that it does not contain any provision with regard to counting of period as in service for the purpose of entitlement of an employee towards increments. Further, Rule 4.9 (b) (ii) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volum I (Part I) Chapter IV clearly indicates that only the leave taken by employees on medical grounds counts for increment purposes, as it provides that "all leave

except extraordinary leave taken otherwise than on medical certificate and the period of deputation out of India shall count for increment in the time-scale applicable to a post in which a Government employee was officiating at the time he proceeded on leave or deputation out of India and would have continued to officiate but for his proceeding on leave or deputation out of India." As such, the benefit of notional increments granted to the petitioner in the year 2014 was without any legal sanction and contrary to the express provisions of the applicable Rules. The respondents, therefore, acted within their jurisdiction in rectifying the said error and ordered recovery of the excess payment.

6. Moreover, the reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Rafiq Masih's case (supra)*, is misplaced. The ratio laid down therein pertains to recovery of excess payment from employees who were not at fault and had either retired or were in lower cadres where recovery would cause undue hardship. In the present case, the petitioner continues to be in active service and the impugned order was passed only after issuance of a show-cause notice thereby, satisfying the principles of natural justice. The recovery sought to be effected is not punitive but corrective, arising from an inadvertent error of pay fixation *de hors* the governing rules. Similarly, the reliance of the petitioner on *Suresh Kumar Chillar's case (supra)* is also misplaced as the facts in that case were clearly distinguishable because the employee therein had already retired and no opportunity of hearing had been afforded before the recovery order was passed.

3



7. In view of the foregoing discussions, it is evident that the benefit of counting the period of Extra-Ordinary Leave taken by the petitioner towards service continuity and increments was contrary to the governing statutory provisions. The respondents are justified in rectifying the mistake and ordering recovery of the excess amount paid to the petitioner. The impugned order dated 24.10.2025 (Annexure P-1) thus calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed.

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE

31.10.2025
yakub

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No